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NPSOR-91-023 




POSTGRAOUflTE SCHOOL 

Monterey, California 




APPLICATION OF THE MODULAR COMMAND 
AND CONTROL STRUCTURE (MCES) TO MARINE 
CORPS SINCGARS ALLOCATION 



Micliael G. ^Sovereign 
Michael Bailey 
AVilliam Kemple 

August 1991 



Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

Prepared for; 

Warfighting Center 

Marine Corps Combat De\’elopment Center 
Quantico, VA 22134-5001 



FEDDOCS 
D 208.14/2 
NPS-OR-91-023 



n \ 07 3 



knox lifraRI 

^AVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOCBU 
210NTERRY CAT TFORNIA 



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 



Rear Admiral R. W. West, Jr. 
Superintendent 



This report was funded by the Naval Postgraduate 
Program. 

This report was prepared by: 



Harrison Shull 
Provost 



School Research 



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NPSOR-91-23 



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^ia Name of Performing Organization 

•'Javal Postgraduate School 



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(If Applicable) OR 



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Naval Postgraduate School 



»c Address {city, state, and ZJP code) 

vionterey, CA 93943-5000 



7 b Address {city, state, and ZIP ccxie) 

Monterev, CA 93943-5000 



la Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organiziihon 

tVarfighting Center 
vlarine Corps Combat 
Development Center 



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T\x\& {Include Security Classificaiion) Application of the Modular Command and Control Structure (MCES) to 

! OTXT/^/^ Ar^O All .! 



12 Personal Author(s) Michael G. Sovereign, William Kemp 


e, .Michael Bailey 


13 a Type of Report 

■ Technical 


13b Time Covered 
From To 


1 4 Date of Report {year, month, day) 

1991, July 


1 5 Page Count 


1 6 Supplementary Notation 

bolicy or position of the 


'he ' 
De 


^ iews expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not ref 
lartment of Defense or the U.S. Government. 


ect the official 


'l 7 Cosati Codes 


1 8 Subject Terms {continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) 



jField 


Group 


Subgroup 









Evaluation; command, control and communications (C3); SINCGARS; networks; 
simulation 



19 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number 



The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES), contains seven steps for the evaluation of 
C3 systems. In this paper the application of these steps is described in general. Then their potential application to 
Marine Corps POM C3 issues is discussed in general temis. Finally the more detailed applications to the 
allocation of Marine Corps tactical voice radios is discussed. An object-oriented model developed at NTS is 
briefly described. 



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M. G. Sovereign 


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(408) 646-2428 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 



TASK lA MCES REVIEW & MEB APPLICATIONS 1 

A. INTRODUCTION 1 

B. MCES MODULES 4 

1. Module 1: Problem Formulation 4 

2. Module 2: C3 System Bounding 6 

3. Module 3: C3 Process Definition 9 

4. Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions 10 

5. Module 5: Specification of Measures 12 

6. Module 6: Data Generation .15 

7. Module 7: Aggregation of Measures 17 

C. ILLUSTRATION: POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE MCES 

TO THE MARINE CORPS POM PROCESS FOR C3 ISSUES 19 

1. Introduction 19 

2. Problems in C3 POM Decision Making 23 

3. Module 1 Problem Formulation — Precise Problem Statement ....28 

4. Module 2 — System Bounding 31 

5. Module 3 — C3 Process Definitions 35 

6. Module 4 — Integration of System Elements and Functions 36 

7. Module 5 — Specification of Measures 38 

8. Module 6 — Generation of Output 40 

9. Module 7 — Aggregation 42 

TASK IB MCES ANALYSIS OF SINCGARS ALLOCATION 45 

A. INTRODUCTION 45 

B. MCES 46 

Module 1: Problem Formulation for SINCGARS allocation 46 

Module 2: System Bounding 47 

Module 3: C3 Process Definition for SINCGARS Allocation 49 



Module 4: Integration of Elements and Functions 52 

Module 5: Specification of Measures for SINCGARS Allocation. ..53 

Module 6: Generation of Output Data 57 

Module 7: Aggregation and Interpretation 60 

APPENDIX A. C2 FACS BASED ON 1ST MEB EXAMPLE 

FOR TACTICAL NETS 62 

APPENDIX B. TACTICAL NETS FOR 1ST MEB EXAMPLE 63 

APPENDIX C C2FACS AND THEIR TACTICAL NETS 64 

APPENDIX D. TIME-LATE PENALTIES FOR BOSTS 66 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 72 



LIST OF FIGURES 



Figure 1. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure 3 

Figure 2. MCES Problem Formulation 5 

Figure 3. MCES C2 Systems Bounding 7 

Figure 4. C3 System Bounding and Level of Analysis 8 

Figure 5. C2 Process Definition 9 

Figure 6. Integration of System Elements and Functions 11 

Figure 7. Specification of Measures 14 

Figures. Data Generation 16 

Figure 9. Aggregation and Interpretation of Measures 18 

Figure 10. Organization Chart 36 

Figure 11. Onion Diagram of SINCGARS Allocation Problem 50 



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY CA 9394S-5101 



TASK lA MCES REVIEW & MEB APPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 

The (MCES) is a general approach to evaluating C3 systems which has 
been successfully applied to a number of issues concerning C3 system 
planning, acquisition, testing and operation. It augments traditional analysis 
by providing a series of seven steps or modules to evaluate alternative C3 
systems and architectures. These modules guide analysts who might 
otherwise focus prematurely on the quantitative model rather than the 
problem definition and the specific measures needed to discriminate between 
alternatives. The seven steps of the MCES are briefly described below 
including the product of each module. 

The MCES begins by identifying the objective of a particular application. 
This leads to a formal problem statement. The second step is to bound the C3 
system involved, by producing a complete list of system elements at several 
levels. The third step is building a dynamic framework that identifies the 
relevant C3 process — a set of functions. These are derived from the generic 
control loop (cybernetic) model of C3. The fourth step combines the results of 
steps two and three by integrating the system elements and the process 
functions into a model or representation of the C3 system. The product of 
this module is at least a complete descriptive conceptual model and 
sometimes a complete mathematical model. The next (fifth) step is to 
specifically identify measures of performance, effectiveness and force 
effectiveness at the corresponding levels of the C3 system and function. The 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



1 



sixth step is to generate results or values for these measures by testing, 
simulation, computational modeling or subjective evaluation. Finally, the 
various measures are aggregated and interpreted in the last step. Each of 
those steps is described as a module below. 

In a new area such as C3, standard language and paradigms are difficult 
but necessary. The MCES was developed by a team of experts from industry, 
government and academia and was endorsed by the Military Operations 
Research Society. It presents difficult concepts in a standardized way that is 
easily absorbed by both new practitioners and managers. MCES has potential 
for reducing mis-understandings of the purpose and mis-applicability of 
analytical results. This is important when issues of great diversity of nature, 
size and level of detail are being considered, such as in preparation of the 
Program Objective memoranda (POM). Standardization of analytical 
procedure can be advantageous if based on a comprehensive and rigorous 
methodology such as MCES. MCES can be used for studies ranging from the 
quick conceptual level to the complete quantitative study. It is difficult if not 
impossible to require a complete quantitative study for each issue during a 
POM cycle, as is required for acquisition cycle issues with the Cost and 
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). But application of the MCES at 
even the conceptual level of analysis may allow better articulation of POM 
tradeoffs. The next section is an exposition of the substance of the MCES. 
This serves as preparation for the required interpretation of the MCES in 
terms of the MEB C3 problem as specified in Task 1. It will then be followed 
by application of the MCES to the allocation of SINCGARS as also required in 
Taskl. 



7 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



The seven steps of the MCES are performed iteratively with the decision 
maker as shown in Figure 1. Iteration is an important concept which 




Figure 1. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure 



Sovereign — Task 1A MCES 



3 



prevents "paralysis by analysis." Iterative refinement of the problem and 
analysis helps both the decision maker and the analyst to prevent studies 
from being overtaken by events. The outputs of each step are also shown in 
Figure 1. Each of the steps or modules is explained below. 

B. MCES MODULES 

1. Module 1: Problem Formulation 

Module 1 describes the decision maker's objective and the context for a 
specific C3 problem as shown in Figure 2. In it the formal decision process (if 
any), the policy assumptions and the scope and depth of analysis are defined. 
The identification of the full set of decision makers being addressed may be 
necessary. In this module both the appropriate mission and scenario(s) are 
made explicit. The output, a precise statement of the problem, is used in the 
second module to bound the C3 system of interest. 

The objectives of the decision maker(s) posing the problem are identified 
in terms of the life cycle of the C3 system and the level of analysis prescribed. 
The decision maker's objectives generally reflect the various phases of the life 
cycle of the C3 system, namely: (1) concept definition and/or development; 
(2) design; (3) acquisition; or (4) operations. The appropriate level of analysis 
is derived from: (1) the mission the system is addressing; (2) the type of 

system itself; (3) the timing, scope and criticality of decision; and (4) the 
background and commitment of the decision maker(s). In this problem 
formulation step, it is wise to make an initial pass at all the MCES steps with 
the objective of identifying the range of likely answers for each module. This 
helps scope the analytical effort as early as possible. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



4 




In the implementation of this step, the answers to several questions may 
provide guidance, namely: 

1. Who is/are the decision maker(s), and how and when will the 
decisions be made? 

2. What mission area is involved? Must joint or combined forces be 
addressed? 

3. What communities /viewpoints must be addressed for acceptance? 

4. What are the basic assumptions of the problem? Classification level? 
Historically how has the problem been solved? 

5. Does the evaluation apply to an individual C3 system or require a 
comparative evaluation of several alternative systems and/or forces? 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



5 






6. What threat and scenarios are appropriate and available? 

7. What part of the life cycle of the C3 system is involved? Time frame? 

8. What level (system, subsystem, platform, force, etc.) is the analysis 
focused upon? 

9. What type of measure, i.e., how quantitative, will answer the decision 
maker's question? 

10. What analytical support will be required? Testing? Simulation? 

In summary, three steps take place in Module 1: (1) the decision maker's 
needs are characterized; (2) the problem's scope and depth are selected; and (3) 
the remaining modules are previewed for their potential impact on the 
problem statement and analytical effort required. 

2. Module 2: C3 System Bounding 

Module 2, as described by Figure 3, enumerates the relevant system 
elements that bound the problem of interest. The first goal is to delineate the 
difference between the system being analyzed and its environment. To 
bound the C3 system, the analyst should employ the three-part definition, 
based upon JCS Publication 1. In it, a C3 system consists of: (1) physical 
entities — equipment, software, people and their associated facilities; (2) 
structure — organization, concepts of operation, standard operating 
procedures, and patterns of information flow; and (3) process — the 
functionality or "what the system is doing" which is pursued in Step 3. In the 
second module the C3 system, identified by its human, hardware and 
software entities and structures, is related to the forces it controls and the 
environmental stimuli to which it responds, including the enemy. Once the 
system elements of the problem have been identified, the C3 system of 
interest may be further bounded by relating the "physical entities" and the 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



6 



structure components to the graphic representation of the levels of analysis, 
using the graphic model as shown in Figure 4. 




This series of levels is referred to as the "onion skin." In the most 
inclusive depiction of this graphic, there are five rings. Beyond the outer ring 
is the rest of the world, which essentially relates to elements and structure 
that exist and may have import with respect to similar problems, but which 
are outside the scope of the problem at hand. In contrast, the outer ring 



7 



Sovereign — Task lA MCFS 




represents the environmental factors that require explicit assumptions in the 
problem. This ring may be seen as including the major scenario components. 
The next ring, moving inward, deals with the forces under influence of the 
C3 system upon which the evaluation is centered. The C3 system itself is the 
focus of the next ring, and its component subsystems make up the innermost 
ring. As is clear from the foregoing, this graphic is a structured static display 
of the physical entities. 




Figure 4. C3 System Boxmding and Level of Analysis 

In summary, 1) the C3 system statics must be distinguished from the C3 
system dynamics, the "C3 process" and its functions. 2) The statics must be be 
listed as the physical entities together with the structural relationships of C3. 
3) The structure is represented by the customary physical arrangement and 
interrelationships of entities in the form of command structure, the standard 
operating procedures, protocols, message formats and reporting requirements. 
Bounding the C3 system often leads to broadening the system of interest. It 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



8 



may be necessary to consider the source of information as well as the display 
that is being decided upon in a particular decision. 

3. Module 3: C3 Process Definition 

After the system is bounded and the system elements identified, the 
dynamic C3 processes of the system are identified as noted in Figure 5. 




Module 3 focuses the analyst's attention on: (1) the environmental 

"initiator" of the C3 process, which results from changes in the desired state, 
usually of enemy forces; (2) the internal C3 process functions (sense, assess. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



9 




generate, select, plan, direct); and (3) the input to and output from the 
internal C3 process and the environment. The C3 process functions are 
generic and may be adapted to the specific functions of air defense, ground 
operations etc. They can be described briefly here as six function. 

• Sense — the function that collects data necessary to describe and forecast 
the environment, which includes: 

(1) The enemy forces, disposition and actions. 

(2) The friendly forces, disposition and actions. 

(3) Those aspects of the environment that are common to both 
forces — for example, weather, terrain and neutrals. 

• Assess — the function that transforms data from the sense function into 
information about intentions and capabilities of enemy forces and 
about capabilities of friendly forces to determine if deviation from the 
desired state warrants further action. 

• Generate — the function that develops alternative courses of action to 
correct deviations from the desired state. 

• Select — the function that selects a preferred alternative from among 
the available options. It includes evaluation of each option in terms of 
criteria necessary to achieve the desired state. 

• Plan — the function that develops implementation details necessary to 
execute the selected course of action. 

• Direct — the function that distributes decisions to the forces charged 
with execution of the decision. 

In summary, these six functions have been found to be sufficiently 
comprehensive to map to almost any C3 process. They are applied iteratively. 
4. Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions 

As noted in Figure 6, in Module 4 the relationships between the physical 
entities and structures (defined in Module 2) and the C3 processes or 
functions (described in Module 3) are first identified and described — who does 
what, when. Then techniques such as PERT charts, data flow diagrams or 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



10 




Figure 6. Integration of System Elements and Functions 



Petri nets may be used to model the messages or information flows that are 
used to control these relationships. Information flows support decisions that 
link the separate C3 functions into the architecture containing the relevant C3 
system. The term “architecture" is used to describe the output of module 4 to 
emphasize the integration via defined interfaces and standards of the 
individual C3 subsystems. The physical entities, structures and functions of 
these individual systems are coherently controlled in a dynamic architecture. 
The architecture might indeed become a functioning computer model of the 
system which would support an evaluation of mission effectiveness. The 
final form of the architecture will at least include the process description of 



11 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 





the system elements performing the processes arranged in a structural 
framework as indicated in Figures 3-4. These may be adequate to support 
qualitative evaluation of the architecture. A quantitative description of the 
elements and the inputs to the processes are required even if a model cannot 
be built in the time available. Even these descriptive inputs allow an 
informal assessment on a subjective basis. In summary this module maps 
Steps 2 and 3 together and provides quantitative information preferably as a 
model of the architecture in a static and/or dynamic mode. 

5. Module 5: Specification of Measures 

A C3 measure can usually be categorized as either a performance measure 
or a vulnerability measure. There are generic sets of both of these categories 
such as the TRI-TAC MOEs shown in Table 1. These TRI-TAC measures are 
generic and need additional specification in terms of a particular scenario and 
C3 system. For example, the units of speed of service, interoperability and 
survivability must be identified with reference to the mission and level of the 
system. 



TABLE 1. TRI-TAC MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 



PERFOR.MANCE MEASURES 


Grade of service 
Information Quality 
Speed of Service 
Call Placement Time 
Service Features 
Lost message Rate 
Spectrum Utilization 
Transportability 
Mobility 

Ease of Reconfiguration 
Ease of Transition 
Interoperability 


VULNERABILITY MEASURES 


Index of Survivability (Overt) 
Index of Survivability (Jamming) 
Index of Availability 
Interrupt Rate 
Security 



SovereigTt — Task lA MCES 



12 



In Module 5, as illustrated in Figure 1 , the analyst specifies the measures 
necessary to answer the problem of interest as defined in Module 1 and in the 
system bounding process and integration. The component levels and 
functions of the C3 system definition modules may be examined to derive an 
initial set of relevant measures, which are then subjected to further scrutiny: 
(1) comparison with a set of criteria. Table 2, which may reduce the number to 
a more manageable set; (2) the remaining measures are then classified as to 
their level of measurement (MOFE, MOE, MOP or parameter) which may 
lead to association of some to a lower level than currently of interest; 

(3) mapping of the MOFE to related MOEs and then to related MOPs, etc., and 

(4) the resulting high level measures are examined for the practicability of 
measuring alternative configurations of the physical entities, structure 
and/or processes of the C3 system in the scenarios defined in Module 1. 
Practicality often drives measurement down to the level of MOE or even 
MOP because combat oriented measurements are inherently difficult. 



TABLE 2. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION MEASURES 



CHARACTERISTICS 


DEFINITION 


Mission-oriented 


Relates to force/system mission 


Discriminatory 


Identified real differences between alternatives 


Measurable 


Can be computed or estimated 


Quantitative 


Can be assigned numbers or ranked 


Realistic 


Relates realistically to the C2 system and associated uncertainties 


Objective 


Can be defined or derived, independent of subjective opinion 


Appropriate 


Relates to acceptable standards and analysis objectives 


Sensitive 


Reflects changes in system variables 


Inclusive 


Reflects those standards required by the analysis objectives 


Independent 


Is mutually exclusive with respect to other measures 


Simple 


Is easily understood bv the user 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



13 



Each of the three levels of the C3 system in the onion-skin diagram is 
directly related to measures of performance (MOPs), measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs), and measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) as shown in Figure 7. 




SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES 



DISCRIMINATING 
CHARACTERISTICS 
MEASURES CRITERIA 



MEASURES 

DP (DIMENSIONAL PARAMETERS) 

MOP (MEASEURES OF PERFORMANCE) 

MOE (MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS) 

MOFE (MEASURE OF FORCE EFFECTIVENESS) 




Figure 7. Specification of Measures 



The determination of the boundary helps to identify what level of 
measure is appropriate. If the boundary between the force and the 
environment is of interest, measures of force effectiveness (MOFE) are 
required. Dealing with the boundary between force and the C3 system leads to 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



14 






measuring the effectiveness (MOE) of the C3 system. At the subsystem 
level — that is within the boundary of the system — are measures of 
performance (MOP) of the functions. Finally, within the subsystem are 
Dimensional Parameters (DP). Measures at the higher level, MOFEs and 
MOEs, are most desirable because they are closer to the ultimate purpose of 
the C3 system and because they summarize many of the lower level measures 
in a meaningful way. 

In summary, this module's implementation results in the specification of 
a set of measures that is focused on the C3 process functions within the C3 
system, the overall performance of the C3 system and on the force 
effectiveness of the C3 system combined with the forces and w'eapon systems, 
if at all practical. 

6. Module 6: Data Generation 

The generation of values for the measures determined in the previous 
module is addressed by the sixth module. These values are the result of the 
implementation of this module as noted in Figure 8. Here, one of several 
types of data generators such as exercises, experiments, simulations, models 
or subjective judgement is selected. The MCES accommodates a variety of 
data generators. The prime requirements are that the data generator is: (1) 
available to the analysis; (2) focused on the mission area/analysis objectives of 
the evaluation; and (3) adaptable to produce, with minimal modification, the 
values associated with the measures specified in the previous module. The 
analyst must consider the following: reproducibility of results, precision and 
accuracy, costs and timing of data collection, environmental controls, and 
experimental design in the final choice of how to generate the values. 



Sovereign — Task lA .MCILS 



15 




This step is directly supported by Module 4, the integration of elements 
and processes. If the integration has resulted in a quantitative model it will 
be straightforward to generate output data. The verification of input data 
from modules 2 and 3 and validation of the model must also be addressed. 
Alternatively, if only a conceptual mapping of function to structure is 
accomplished in Module 4, the generation of values for measures may be 
only a qualitative comparison table or relative judgmental statements by 
experienced personnel. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



16 





In the typical implementation, the relationships established in module 4 
are translated into computer code. In this process it will often be necessary to 
define additional relationships and obtain more input data. The validation 
and verification of this code as a representation of the problem must also be 
addressed. The National Test Bed's Confidence Assessment Methodology is a 
recommended reference for this step. 

7. Module 7: Aggregation of Measures 

In Module 6, Data Generation, the analyst obtains values for the specified 
measures which will be analyzed and interpreted in this module as noted in 
Figure 9. Because varying scenarios may be important for each iteration of 
the MCES, the analyst must determine the importance of each factor. The 
final module addresses the issue of how to aggregate and interpret the 
measures. Three levels of measurement (performance, effectiveness and 
force effectiveness) with multiple values from each level may be available. 
The current state of the art requires that both qualitative (such as red-yellow- 
green charts) and quantitative (such as utility weighting) aggregation 
techniques be considered. 

The nature of the problem and available tools determine the mix of these 
techniques. Different problem areas addressing different decision makers' 
analytic needs will result in differing requirements for aggregation of 
constituent measures, but the mappings between levels allow the decision 
maker to make an informed decision and understand the reasons for it. The 
issues of measure causality, sufficiency and independence must be considered. 
The analyst must decide if the decision maker's original queries have been 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



17 



addressed by the MCES analysis. Finally, suitable graphics should be prepared 
for interaction with the decision maker. 




The implementation of this module provides the analytical results 
tailored to address the problem posed at the beginning of the procedure. The 
results, made up of the aggregated values and measures, should be provided 
to the decision maker in a format that will expedite his consideration of the 
analysis. Whenever appropriate, graphics are used to summarize and show 
trade-offs. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



18 




Finally the results are provided to the decision maker. Two courses of 
action are available. First, the decision makers may identify the need for 
further iteration. Or they may proceed to implement the decision. In most 
situations, explanation of objectives and the reasoning behind the decision 
help the implementation by lower levels of the organization. MCES is an aid 
in conveying the context, structure and evidence supporting the decision to 
these levels. 

C ILLUSTRATION: POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE MCES TO THE 

MARINE CORPS POM PROCESS FOR C3 ISSUES 

1. Introduction 

The MCES may be of value as a means of structuring analysis for POM 
decision-making regarding MEB C3 issues. This section will discuss possible 
advantages of the MCES in the POM environment, which has been briefly 
witnessed by one of the research team members. It will be followed by a 
general discussion of the difficulty of POM tradeoffs and in later sections by a 
description of how such issues might be treated in each module of the MCES. 
Later the MCES will be applied to the SINCGARS allocation problem in a 
detailed manner leading up to an example of analysis of the SINCGARS 
similar to that which could be accomplished for POM issues of particular 
significance. 

The discussion is limited to MEB C3. Broader issues clearly exist in the 
POM but the MEB is a reasonable focus for a mission-oriented approach such 
as MCES, which was designed for addressing single issues. If the MCES 
approach to the MEB-level POM issues seems meritorious, projections of 
application to broader issues could be developed. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



19 



One of the difficulties of decision making in the POM process is the wide 
variation in scope and level of the competing POM initiatives, i.e., roughly 1 
million to 100 million dollars in yearly costs. MCES may be of benefit in three 
ways: (1) standardized identification of mission and function so that the area 
of impact of the initiative can be pinpointed, (2) relative assessment of the 
contribution of the initiatives to solution of the problems they address in 
their area; and (3) highlighting of potential interface and interoperability 
issues or synergistic benefits of individual initiatives. Each of these three is 
discussed below. 

The first contribution of MCES is to provide a means of narrowing the 
scope of each decision by identifying the areas affected by an initiative. This 
will prevent sponsors of initiatives from citing benefits of all kinds to 
everyone. Although this claim may be true to some extent, this approach 
hampers decision-making. Even a quick, qualitative application of the MCES 
results in an identification of the major applicability of an initiative. The 

MCES requires identification of the following for each POM initiative; 

1. mission area affected 

2. command center elements impacted 

3. C3 architectures impacted 

4. C3 processes and procedures affected 

5. major C3 hardware and software systems affected 

6. possible environmental constraints (all-weather, etc.), 

7. time frame of contributions in the field, 

8. measures of force effectiveness, C3 system effectiveness and subsystem 
effectiveness appropriate for measuring the impact, 

9. a first cut of what would be necessary to generate the data to measure 
the impact of the initiative, and 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



20 



10. a first cut at an aggregation of the information necessary to decide on 
the cost effectiveness of the initiative. 

If this information could be systematically available for each alternative, 
it is likely that POM decision making could be more well-structured and 
would waste less time on irrelevant definitional problems or third-order 
claims of contribution. 

As a simple example, consider Table 3. The two-dimensions of the table 
are very aggregated mission by aggregated C3 function. Even at this level it 
would be possible to identify the areas impacted by each initiative with time 
frame of impact coded by short, mid or long term within the table. This 
would enable decision makers to see the distributions of effort across mission 
and C3 process and to identify possible overlaps, duplication or holes in the 
total effort. 



TABLE 3. ILLUSTRATIVE MCES-POM DISPLAY 



AGGREGATED C3 
PROCESS FUNCTIONS 


AGGREGATED \flSSIONS 


COMMAND 


AIR 

COMBAT 


GROUND 

COMBAT 


CSS 


1 . Acquire Information 










2. Process Information 










3. Disseminate Information 

a. Connectivity 

b. Delay 

c. Vulnerability 











Addition of an assessment for the POM of the threat, baseline capability 
and relative deficiency or net assessment of current capability in these 
categories would be helpful in translating this table into decision making. Of 
course finer division of mission and C3 process could contribute to the 
identification but might make it more difficult to make the net assessment. 
Additional dimensions from the list of ten above could also be added. 



21 



Sovereign — Task lA MCILS 



Although this information could be collected without MCES, the rigor of the 
MCES avoids distortion produced by sponsors' enthusiasm for their 
initiatives. 

In addition to the identification of the area of contribution of the 
initiative, the MCES can give qualitative or quantitative assessments of how 
much impact the initiative can make. A full quantitative analysis such as 
will be illustrated for SINCGARS would be preferable but may not be possible 
in the time-constrained POM environment. However, a qualitative analysis 
can be performed relatively quickly. If presented in standardized MCES form, 
these analyses could serve as the basis for judgmental or group decision- 
making efforts to categorize the impact as: significant, marginal or negligible 
in each relevant area, for example. With the cost of each initiative known, as 
it is for most POM initiatives, relative cost-effectiveness could also be assessed 
by the same qualitative methods. 

Again these qualitative assessments could be done without the MCES but 
the systematic rigor of MCES encourages critique of each initiative's weak 
points and identifies incompleteness. It also makes clear how much 
additional effort would be required to obtain dependable assessments and 
therefore highlights the real uncertainty in the benefits of the initiatives. 

Another way in which MCES contributes to the relative assessment of the 
contribution of the initiatives, even without complete quantifiable 
measurement, is the identification of measures of performance, measures of 
C3 effectiveness and/or measures of force effectiveness for the initiative. 
Even without knowing the quantitative values of these, it may be possible to 
compare several initiatives simply by their obvious qualitative differences in 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



22 



impact on these same measures. Experience has shown that doubling of 
measures of performance will generally have a much lower impact on 
measures of C3 effectiveness (perhaps a 10-50% improvement) and only a 
very minor impact on measures of force effectiveness (a few percentage 
points) This gives some idea of a threshold for effectiveness of initiativ'es at 
the measure of performance level. When costs of the initiatives are known, 
it can also give a very rough indication of cost effectiveness because a C3 
initiative that represents a large increase in the cost of a total force can rarely 
be recovered in increased force effectiveness (Achilles heels excepted). 

The third contribution of the MCES to POM assessment of initiatives is 
the identification of interfaces of the initiatives with the existing C3 system. 
This can be useful in two distinct ways. It helps identify what other C3 
systems or processes will probably have to be improved in order to take 
advantage of the initiative (or to make the initiative actually pay ofO. Often 
these impacts are overlooked by the sponsors of initiatives. It can also 
indicate where interoperability must be carefully considered if the 
effectiveness of the initiative is not to be totally lost because of inability of 
other areas to meet the interface requirements. Incompatibilities of bit vice 
character-oriented systems, data rates, message formats, etc., are also often 
overlooked. These can add significantly to the final costs of C3 initiatives, as 
can training in new processes or procedures which can also be identified by 
the MCES. 

2. Problems in C3 POM Decision Making 

One of the first steps in dealing with a problem is to formulate the 
problem in such a manner that it will be possible to determine when an 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



23 



answer has been identified. This involves a dilemma. One the one hand 
everyone wants crisp definitive answers which will be immutable. On the 
other hand everyone wants to keep their options open and not make 
important decisions until necessary. The first leads to overly specific, detailed 
answers to yesterday's problems. The latter leads to bland statements of 
general principle without narrowing the scope of the problem. In the POM 
environment it is easy to avoid decisions by delay and program stretch-out 
rather than cancellation. 

In general, MEB C3 problems can be described as the inability to ensure 
that all levels of command will have convenient access to the information 
needed to make timely decisions under all combat conditions. In the POM 
environment it is easy to forget that more equipment is not necessarily the 
answer. The ability to make good MEB C3 resource allocation decisions in the 
POM requires selecting those systems which blend simplicity and flexibility of 
performance with the benefits of newer technology including training and 
supply constraints. For example an excellent system which requires 
specialized training should not be assigned to frontline units where the only 
specialist may likely become unavailable. Selection and allocation of new 
systems must be harmonized with the totality of the existing complex C3 
system. For example while information must be guarded from disruption by 
the enemy, disruption can also occur from inadequate planning for the 
tactical implications, doctrinal deviations and excessive training load of 
inappropriate new systems or procedures. 

Since C3 is a total system, the interoperability and compatibility of 
elements is of paramount importance. Backward and downward 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



24 



compatibility and interoperability are crucial because of the long time for 
adoption of most systems. But upward adaptability (P3I) and consistency with 
long-run architecture is vital if today's decisions are not to handicap 
tomorrow's options. In the POM decision-making, technological perspective 
through time should be maintained. If the burn-in period of a new system 
approaches its obsolescence time, it would be better to wait for the next 
system. New technology itself is never a reason for replacement. The 
technology must promise very significantly better performance without 
training and logistical burdens before new investment is appropriate, unless 
the existing system is a "dog." There are always other C3 areas which have 
more pressing needs than "new and nice to have." Obsolete systems can be 
assigned to high or low usage units as appropriate to ease transition such as 
when one system must wait for others or when compatibility requires an 
entire system to be replaced. 

A particularly difficult aspect of resource allocation in C3 is that of combat 
vulnerability and its tradeoff with field performance. The closer to the 
combat environment, the more important is the simplicity, ruggedness and 
short-term reliability of equipment and the need for extremely quick 
response. These features can be jeopardized by multiple modes of operation 
for security, anti-jam or low probability of intercept (LPI) protection. 
However there is also the principle that the forward elements are closer to the 
enemy and therefore more susceptible to attack, either physically or 
electronically by jamming exploitation or direction finding (or self-jamming), 
so these features may be overriding if the information is useful to the enemy. 



Sovereign — Task lA MQ‘5 



25 



Similarly the lower in an organization that a system is placed^ the more of 
the systems that will be required by the organization. This implies a larger 
training plan and higher logistical loads. Thus it is important that systems for 
use in the company or battalion be very simple, rugged and reliable as well as 
small and portable. High power, capacity or range are typically not needed in 
these elements because of their geographic compactness. 

Another dimension frequently overlooked is the hierarchical 
interdependence of problems. What looks like a problem at the battalion 
level may simply be one at the brigade level that has been pushed down to 
the battalion. It is almost always easier to solve problems at higher levels 
than at lower levels where more people are impacted. The only exception is 
problems at the joint or combined level are often easier to solve at service 
lower levels because it is difficult to get unity of command or interpretation 
of the mission at high levels. In the POM environment many decision 
makers are involved with differing backgrounds regarding the issues. A 
standardized methodology makes it much easier for those not originally 
involved to understand the reasoning of the others who have made earlier 
decisions. 

The discussion above should be sufficient to establish that problem 
formulation for POM C3 resource allocations for the MEB is not an easy 
matter. What guidance can the MCES give for problem formulation? The 
most important is to frame the problem (question) in terms of the mission of 
the force unit not that of C3 itself. More C3 will always serve the interest of 
C3 but not necessarily of the force. C3 should not get in the way of fighting (or 
of the training for fighting)! Ideally the question should always be "Can we 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



26 



show this resource investment is the best way to win the war?", or "How can 
we kill more enemy with what we've got?" This focuses the question on 
crucial aspects of using the forces to their fullest potential, not on providing 
information that may itself not be used. This focus requires ability to identify 
where critical problems will occur in combat — again a potentially very 
difficult forecasting problem made easier by combat experience or realistic 
exercises. But without such assessment it is easy to spend time fixing the 
accessories or polishing the hood when the engine won't run or is out of gas. 
Secondly the MCES actively encourages looking at the question broadly. 
Many times C3 acquisition issues are substitutes for dealing with difficult 
organizational issues or even training and doctrine problems. Better 
planning and training are often a better answer to the need for more real-time 
coordination circuits. A distributed graphic tactical picture is still better than a 
thousand words, particularly if the local commander can select the picture he 
wants without being inundated with extraneous information. 

The MCES explicitly includes treatment of the dynamics of C3. Problem 
formulation must take the time dimension into account explicitly. C3 
problems are evolutionary, as are their solutions. A history of the problem iS’ 
important. Requiring a time-phased plan that keeps options open and buys 
information to take advantage of the options should be part of the problem 
formulation. 

Next the steps in the MCES are illustrated by discussion of applicability to 
the C3 issues in the POM, keeping the difficulties discussed above in mind. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



27 



3. Module 1 Problem Formulation — Precise Problem Statement 

It is necessary to limit the scope of this discussion since 1) there are no 
experts regarding the specific POM issues on the research team and 2) to keep 
the illustration of the MCES as applied to the POM issues concerning MEB C3 
within reasonable limits as an introduction to the later SINCGARS allocation 
problem. POM decisions are strongly driven by cost and budgetary 
constraints, changes in perceived threats, politics at all levels, technological 
feasibility of a great variety of systems, etc., all of which are only tangential to 
the SINCGARS allocation problem. Therefore discussion will be limited to 
the question of how to elucidate POM initiatives for their total potential 
impact on MEB C3. 

The Marine Corps has a formal, quantitative process for selection of 
competing initiatives in the POM. This process is based on the zero-based 
budgeting requirements of the Carter-era POM process in which initiatives 
are first priority-ordered and the resulting list is subject to a cutoff based on 
cumulative budget. The process incorporates a procedure for quantitatively 
measuring the relative benefit of each initiative. The benefit value for each 
initiative is then divided by the cost and the ratio is used directly to order the 
initiatives into a prioritized list. The prioritized list can then be cut off at 
whatever budget is available. The entire list is subject to review by 
knowledgeable officers at higher levels and adjustments can be made, but the 
process is heavily dependent on the strengths of the ordered list and the 
quantification of the benefit of each of the initiatives. Because of this 
dependence, the features of the list and quantification are examined in the 
following paragraphs. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



28 



The zero-based budgeting technique of a prioritized list for budget cutoff 
has two chief strengths. First, it makes quite obvious the truth that all 
initiatives must compete for funding: that all ten pounds must fit into the 
five pound budget bag. This truth is often not obvious to the sponsors of 
competing initiatives, all of which have some merit. It is easier for sponsors 
to accept that other initiatives are better rather than to be told that their 
initiatives are not worth their cost. The second strength is the flexibility to 
respond to fluctuations in the budget cutoff level. This is particularly useful 
when a number of hierarchical decision processes are involved which make 
allocation of total budget to the lower levels difficult to make. In this POM 
process the lower levels can make up their "wish lists" without specific 
budget targets available. 

The weaknesses of the zero-based approach, which have led to its 
abandonment in most of the government, are also two-fold. It assumes 
independence of the initiatives and requires a complete ordering of the 
initiatives when only a fraction of the initiatives will actually need to be 
compared. These weaknesses are not controlling for the Marine Corps 
because of the relatively smaller size of the Marine Corps compared to other 
services. 

The strength of the quantification method is that it can be applied when 
more rigorous measurements are not available. Its weaknesses are in 
handling multi-dimensional comparisons and multiple decision-making 
levels. The method is often illustrated by the example of a person without a 
scale ordering the weight of a set of rocks by comparison only, a task for which 
the method is well suited. The method is much less valid for initiatives with 



Sovereign — Task lA .MCES 



29 



many dimensions being evaluated by different groups. Moreover the method 
generally assumes independence of the initiatives. Unfortunately this 
assumption reinforces the assumiption of independence in the zero-based 
budgeting procedure and could lead to quite erroneous decisions if the 
ordered lists are not thoroughly examined after the budget cutoff to make 
sure that no essential elements are left out of the budget. This gross error can 
be avoided by inspection and reinsertion of those initiatives below the cutoff 
that are essential to those remaining within the budget cutoff. However it is 
much more difficult to similarly correct the uni-dimensionality of the 
method, particularly when combined with the zero-based budgeting 
approach. Since the method orders on the basis of overall benefit, it may 
over-emphasize one mission, geographic area, function or any other 
subdivision of the total Marine Corps effort. The division of the benefit by 
cost for priority ordering means that a particular subdivision may dominate 
the list simply because it is cheaper to fix that particular problem. The 
method leads away from a balanced POM particularly when reinforced by the 
zero-based budgeting approach and especially during sizeable budget cuts. 
This effect can be alleviated by placing large amounts of the budget in a 
balanced "core" that is not prioritized, but this fix becomes less effective as the 
core becomes larger but budget cuts affect more initiatives. This can be seen 
in the extreme: if only a few initiatives could be afforded, they almost 
certainly will not be well-balanced if only ordered by the quantification 
method. 

It is assumed that the Marine Corps feels that the current POM process is 
acceptable. What are the features of the MCES that might offset the 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



30 



weaknesses of zero-based budgeting combined with the quantification 
method? The major danger is that an unbalanced or incomplete POM can 
result from interdependencies of the initiatives which are not addressed in 
the methodology. To avoid this, MCES provides a means of subdividing the 
POM into major missions or other areas affected by the initiatives. Moreover 
MCES provides a means of looking beyond overall benefit of initiatives to the 
specific contributions of each initiative to these missions. Even without a 
complete quantification analysis it identifies interrelationships and 
appropriate measures. Finally it gives an indication of what effort would 
have to be expended to quantitatively show that an initiative is actually cost- 
effective. This alone may lead to more realistic assessments by sponsors. 

4. Module 2 — System Bounding 

The purpose of system bounding is to explicitly define the physical scope 
of the problem. The outputs are lists or tables of the physical elements and 
structures that enumerate the levels of the problems. Because of the 
illustrative nature of this case and the breadth of MEB C3, the lists will not be 
comprehensive or in the detail that will be provided in the SIXCGARS 
allocation problem. 

The system of focus is the MEB C3. The conceptual name for this is the 
Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS). It consists 
of the people and the hardware and software systems in the operational 
headquarters or facilities (C2FACs) of the MEB. The generic C2FACs are listed 
as Table 4. There are subsystems of the MTACCS for ground C3, aviation C3, 
combat service support (CSS) C3, and intelligence. Table 5 shows some of the 
major third level systems under each of these. Some of these are currently 



Sovereign — Task lA MCFS 



31 



under development while others are in place. The communications 
elements are represented in the Marine Corps Tactical Communications 
Architecture overview chart which cannot be reproduced at this scale but 
which should be familiar to anyone involved in the POM C3 discussions. 



TABLE 4. GENERIC C2 FACS (SELECTED) 

A. COMMAND ELEMENT (CE) 

1. COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (COC 

2. INTELLIGENCE CENTER (IC) 

3. SIGINT/EW COORDINATION CENTER (S/EVVCC) 

4. TACTICAL LOGISTICS GROUP (TACLOG) 

5. SYSTEMS CONTROL TECH CONTROL (TECHCON) 

6. REAR ARE OPERATIONS CENTER (RAOC) 

B. GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT 

1. COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (COC) 

2. INTELL CENTER (IN) 

3. HRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER (FSCC) 

4. ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER (ARTY FDC) 

5. FORWARD OBSERVER (FO) 

6. COMMAND POST (CP) 

C. AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT 

1. TACTICAL AIR COMMAND CENTER /DIRECTION CENTER 
(TACC/SADC) 

2. TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS CENTER/ EARLY WARNING 
(TACC/SADC) 

3. DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC) 

D. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT 

The elements above are related by certain structures, in MCES terms. The 
primary well-defined structures are the command structure of the MEB 
shown in Figure 10 by the C2FACS and the radio guard chart or the network 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



32 



structure which is shown in the MCTCA overview chart. These provide the 
authority and conceptual connectivity for C3. Another well-defined structure 
is that of the Marine Tactical Systems Message Text documents (MTS-MTF) 
which define the information that flows within the networks in Volume IV 
of the TPID. Apart from these hard copy messages, much of the specialized 
computer to computer data flows in accordance with message series defined 
by Tactical Automated Data Information Links (TADIL). This is part of the 
interoperability structure which is available as needline tables of C2FAC 
interconnection such as shown in the tables of the Marine Corps Tactical 
Communications Architecture (MCTCA). Less well-defined structures are the 
doctrine and standard operating procedures that are completely or partially in 
place for existing and future systems. Access to data concerning the detailed 
parameters of these systems and the structures in which they are 
implemented is needed to make choices in the POM on MEB C3 issues. The 
data however should be selectively organized to support the later modules of 
the MCES or it can become overwhelming. In practice much of this less well- 
defined data is available only in the minds of experienced personnel. 

TABLE 5. MTACCS SYSTEM AND ILLUSTRATIVE SECOND AND THIRD 

LEVEL SYSTEMS 

Ground C2 System (Second Level) 

Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) (Third Level) 

Fireflex System (Third Level) 

Aviation C2 System (Second Level) 

Advanced Tactical Air Command and Control Central (ATACC) 

Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM) 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



33 



Combat Service Support System (Second Level) 

Marine Integrated Personnel System (MIPS) 

Logistics Automated Information System (LOGISTATS) 

Intelligence System (Second Level) 

Technical Control and Analysis Center (TAC) 

Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Process and Evaluation System 
(TERPES) 

The forces supported by the MTACCS are those of the MEB and the naval 
or joint forces that are supporting the MEB. Again, this includes the complete 
force units with ground, air, and CSS elements, not merely their C3 in the 
C2FACs. Understanding of the missions and capabilities of the forces is 
important for predicting the payoff of C3 initiatives if measures of force 
effectiveness (MOFEs) are used for assessment, as is most desirable. Within 
the POM process this is largely left to the operational experience of the 
participants. 

The environment of the C3 system and the forces controlled includes the 
physical environment (terrain, geography, weather), the threat, supporting 
command structures including higher level commands and intelligence 
agencies, as well as medical, training and other support structures for the 
MEB outside of the CSS unit and finally the theatre and national level 
communications systems. The diverse and rapidly changing environment of 
the MEB means that a variety of systems report the intelligence, 
meteorological, positional, navigational, and identification status of its 
elements. 

The rest of the world which does not affect the issues at hand is assumed 
here to be everything not enumerated above. In reality, as mentioned at the 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



34 



beginning, many doctrinal, technical, and political issues affect the POM 
decisions. Clearly those must be identified on an ad hoc basis. 

5. Module 3 — C3 Process Definitions 

The C3 process consists of the functions that must be performed by the C3 
system to coordinate forces in the planning and execution of their mission. 
The MCES breaks the process into functions of sense, assess, generate, select, 
plan and direct. The Marine Corps has a set of activities called Marine Corps 
Basic Operational Tasks (MBOTs) which describe in detail the tasks of the 
C2FACs in conducting, planning and executing the missions such as fire 
control. These tasks are defined primarily in terms of messages that must be 
passed between the generic C2FACs of the Marine Corps Tactical Command 
and Control System mentioned above. These tasks are more detailed than 
appropriate for some POM C3 issues but many of the participants would be 
familiar with them from experience. The overall MBOT structure provides 
the basis for more detailed analysis on major issues which are consistent with 
quantitative modeling. This will be described in the SINCGARS application. 
In lieu of a detailed study such as for SINCGARS, the MCES functions 
provide a mental checklist for evaluating the completeness, balance and 
interoperability interfaces of any C3 initiative being applied to the MEB 
missions. 



Sovereigrt — Task lA MCES 



35 




Figure 10. Organization Chart 



6. Module 4 — Integration of System Elements and Functions 

This step identifies the interrelationship of the elements and structures 
found in Step 2, system bounding, with the processes of Step 3. The result is 
an architecture which assigns function to element. The Marine Corps has an 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



36 



architectural concept for C3 in the C2 Master Plan. Based on 1987 C2 plan, it 
consists of the Landing Force Integrated Communications System (LFICS) 
Architecture, the Marine Corps Communications, Navigation, Identification 
(CNI) architecture and the Marine Corps Command, Control, 
Communication and Computer (C4) System Architecture Capstone. These 
architectures come together in the Marine Corps Basic Operational Tasks 
(MBOTs) which designates activities for C2FACS and force units which were 
identified in Step 3. 

The C2FAC MBOTs however can be the though of as procedures for 
members of an orchestra to play their individual instruments. A score or 
scenario and a conductor or commander must be added to hear a symphony. 
The symphony can be heard in the mind of POM C3 decision makers based 
on their experience, or can be approximated by some exercise, test or 
simulation if time is available. Usually the results of small scale tests or 
simulations are available but it is up to the POM decision makers to 
extrapolate to the effect on the whole orchestra playing various scenarios. 
Part of the difficulty in POM decisions that explains variations in the decision 
makers views is predicting the degree of skill which the players will reach 
with new instruments or new scenarios which may call for changes in 
training, doctrine or MBOTs. Reports of developmental and operational 
testing should be available for POM decisions on C3 acquisitions but those 
tests are usually focused at the operator level rather than on the performance 
at MOE or MOFE level which would be more relevant for POM level 
decisions on priority, number and timing of systems to be acquired. 



Sovereign — Task 1A .MCES 



37 



The Marine Corps is already moving from manual, unsecure voice, 
analogue radio-telephone tactical C3 to a significantly automated, 
computerized, digital, secure telecommunications system. This requires that 
the assignment of function to element (who does what) which is the 
foundation of any architecture must become less flexible and more well 
defined because the hardware and software replaces manual flexibility with 
technically determined interfaces which must be compatible. The 
architecture must specify standards for these interfaces or specialized 
functions will become isolated even as they become more capable. 
Conformance with defined architectures must be a criterion for evaluation of 
initiatives in the POM process. MCES analyses of module 4 can identify 
important interfaces that are not obvious when considered only as 
communications or ADP systems. 

7. Module 5 — Specification of Measures 

This module identifies what are the relevant MOPs, MOEs and or MOFEs 
for decision making for an issue. The MCES emphasizes the importance of 
MOEs and MOFEs. The Marine Corps apparently has no existing guidance 
with regard to this module. Measures can be classified in several different 
ways, for example quantitative vice subjective. Either may be appropriate in 
the POM C3 decisions, but as more detailed analyses are performed, 
quantitative measures are emphasized. For example, measures change from 
only relative or categorical to those having precise physical units. 

In general, measures relate either to performance; how well the system 
does its job, or to vulnerability; how reliably it performs under stressed 
conditions. Often high performance systems also have higher vulnerability 



Sovereign— Task lA MCES 



38 



partly because of the necessity of centralization or simply through error by a 
specialized operator, which cannot be diagnosed or fixed by anyone else. 

Twenty years ago, the TRI-TAC joint communications organization, later 
to become the Joint Tactical C3 Agency, identified 6 specific measures of 
performance and vulnerability effectiveness which have become standards 
for communication. The TRI-TAC measures were shown in Table 1. 
Performance includes measures of timeliness, quality, efficiency, and 
convenience within a communications context. For example timeliness 
measures include speed of service and call placement time. The quality of 
service is measured by grade of service and information quality 
(intelligibility) as well as lost message rate and intercept rate. Efficiency is 
measured by spectrum utilization and ease of transition and interoperability. 
Convenience includes transportability, mobility and ease of reconfiguration. 
Vulnerability is measured by survivability against destruction and against 
jamming and availability. Fairly precise definitions were made by TRI-TAC 
for each of these measures. Note that they are largely (with the exception of 
survivability) scenario independent i.e. they can be determined from tests of 
the equipments in laboratory environments. They are therefore generally 
MOPs by the MCES hierarchical definition of equipment parameters, MOPs, 
MOEs and MOFEs. The TRI-TAC measures are probably not of high enough 
level for assessment of most POM C3 issues although they may be useful in 
comparing alternative communications systems and for identifying 
interoperability. Survivability if measured on a system level, is also 
appropriate. 



Sovereign — Task I A MCES 



39 



As noted above, POM C3 issues are now being dealt with by establishing 
relative benefit without specifications of MOEs or MOFEs and with particular 
attention to benefit-costs ratio. In a group decision making such as the POM, 
detailed discussion and debate on lower level measures of performance, 
MOPs or even equipment parameters, can preclude the more important 
discussions of higher level measures, MOEs and MOFEs. Lower level 
measures should of course be accurate but since they are often unknown or 
vary with scenario, it can be useful to focus discussion on only the critical 
MOPs as determined by review of higher level MOEs and their relationship to 
the MOPs. This contrasts with simply identifying differences in the lower 
level measures as is often the focus in POM discussions. MCES can help raise 
the sights of the POM C3 issue discussions to higher level measures even 
when the discussions must be qualitative. In comparison to the current 
approach, MCES leaves a traceability of why one system was considered to be 
better than another. 

8. Module 6 — Generation of Output 

The purpose of this module is to combined the results of module 4, the 
architecture, (the relationships of the elements and processes) with 
techniques for generating the values of the measures chosen in module 5. 
For most POM issues, where qualitative MOEs are to be evaluated by 
judgmental or group decision making, the specific architecture may be 
assessed directly by the individuals using qualitative categorical or relative 
scoring. Often these assessment are based only on equipment parameters. 
When more time is available, or when choices between quite different 
systems, a model, test or exercise may be set up to provide quantitative values 



Sovereign — Task 1A MCES 



40 



of the higher level measures. The model may be a detailed computer 
simulation of the C3 functions as performed by the elements. Ideally this 
model of the C3 system will serve as the decision making portion of a combat 
model or can be interfaced to an existing combat model so that MOFEs can be 
obtained. Both tests and models to POM issues are discussed briefly below. 

The results of tests and exercises are particularly appropriate for both 
direct assessment of alternatives or for validation of the model. Validated 
models can then examine more scenarios than are possible in field tests. In 
the POM decisions tests and exercises will have great impact but again 
experienced extrapolation of test results will be necessary unless a model is 
available. 

Conducting tests requires that prototype or qualified systems are available 
and that detailed training and doctrine have been adjusted to the new system. 
Usually, this comes too late for many of the POM C3 issues. Therefore 
models of varying complexity and validity are often used to produce values 
for measures. Models require great amounts of data concerning the bounded 
elements and the functions. Often much of the input structure and process is 
undocumented except in the minds of experienced personnel. The MCES can 
provide a template for determining whether a model was appropriately 
matched to the issue. By identifying the important measures, MCES 
establishes whether the outputs of the model were appropriate for the 
decision. By establishing the elements and functions, it can indicate whether 
the model had the right input data. Even simply bounding the system 
indicates whether the models scope and depth were well matched to the 
problem. 



41 



Sovereign — Task lA MCTS 



The documentation of 1) the assumed scenario and architecture, 2) the 
relationship and the approximations in the model, 3) the input data for 
equipment parameters, environment, 4) any verification and/or validation is 
very important to the credibility of the results for POM decisions. Often 
considerable efforts at measurement both in testing and modeling are deemed 
not credible by experienced decision makers. Following the MCES can help 
avoid such waste of time and expenditure. 

Even a well-documented model may generate non-credible results 
without an appropriate experimental design which can establish the statistical 
validity of the model under varying environments. Appropriate designs for 
large-scale simulations require considerable time in both planning and 
execution. Because of the importance of the man-machine interface to C3 
systems and the difficulty of modeling human decision-making, C3 models, 
as opposed to communication models, often call upon humans as elements. 
These models are actually gaming systems. Thorough training of appropriate 
human operators is particularly important in the testing of C3 systems with 
games. Credibility depends upon the experience of the games and can be 
enhanced by having the decision makers participate as in the Navy POM 
games at Newport. Following the MCES provides a checklist to ensure that 
the preparation of such a game is complete and that worthwhile answers will 
be obtained. What is tracked is the overall relative benefit of the initiative 
compared to others. 

9. Module 7 — Aggregation 

Usually a number of measures with values will have been identified by 
application of the MCES modules above. These measures must be aggregated 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



42 



to the highest degree possible so that the original question can be answered. 
This includes an assessment of the credibility and sensitivity of the results. 

In the case of the POM process, there are many issues being considered 
simultaneously and most issues have inter-relationships with other systems 
and issues. This makes for particularly complex decision making. One 
reason for group POM decision making is to take advantage of the knowledge 
of many individuals in identifying and keeping track of the 
interrelationships. In the group decision making it is possible to keep track 
and aggregate dollar costs across initiatives and years. There is currently no 
organized means of tracking or aggregating measures of performance, 
effectiveness or force effectiveness by mission or function nor the many 
interfaces between systems. It may be possible to apply the MCES to 
standardize formulation of POM C3 issues, to track interfaces and to aggregate 
measures of effectiveness. The Table 1 shown earlier reflects one mechanism 
for accomplishing this. 

With regard to measures of effectiveness, using MCES may make it 
possible to indicate the extent to which major force units are supported by C3 
processes and systems. For example in air operations C3, the sense, assess, 
generate, select, plan and direct cycle can be aggregated in timelines. A time 
window for planning and targeting that would permit full sortie rates and 
accurate ordnance delivered on target by Harriers or other aircraft could be 
established and compared to current performance. The potential reduction 
from current time could come from sensors, computers, planning aids or 
communications. Thus each different system is compared on one MOE. This 



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approach has been used in Air Command and Control System planning in 
NATO's air defense system. 

In summary, the MCES, although not devised for a POM decision-making 
environment, could provide standardized information on the 
interrelationships of C3 initiatives that would compensate for some of the 
methodological weaknesses of the current Marine Corps POM decision- 
making. 



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TASK IB MCES ANALYSIS OF SINCGARS ALLOCATION 



A. INTRODUCTION 

The Marine Corps plans to purchase over 12,000 frequency hopping VHF 
SINCGARS radios of six different configurations. Half (6000) of these are the 
man pack PRC-119 which will replace the existing PRC -77 and half are the 
vehicular VRC-88 to 92 models which replace the VRC-12. They will be 
phased in over about six years so there will be a long period when the 
frequency hopping radio and the single channel PRC-77 and VRC-12 radios 
must coexist. This raises a question of allocation of the new SINCGARS 
within the Marine Corps. The final allocation will depend upon many 
logistical and training factors but a primary factor should be the potential 
operational impact in combat. The Warfighting Center has asked NPS for an 

analvtical tool to address the relative effectiveness of alternative SINCGARS 

✓ 

allocations. Such a tool could potentially serve for architectural evaluation 
for other new systems as well. 

The NPS approach was to define the problem following the Modular 
Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) and to model the 
alternative network architectures with a flexible object-oriented simulation 
written in the MODSIM language. Linking these two stages requires a 
quantitative measure of C3 effectiveness. The development of the measure 
of effectiveness is outlined in this document and a table of relative 
performance values (penalties) for application of the measure is presented for 
review by the Warfighting Center. Described in detail below, the quantitative 



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measure of C3 effectiveness to be produced by the model will be the total 
penalty-weighted time late of VHF messages. These messages are directly 
linked to the C3 activities of the MAGTF by a scenario-independent set of 
doctrinal tasks performed by Marine Corps C2 elements known as C2FACS. 
With this measure and the simulation model, analyses can readily be 
performed to test the robustness of any radio allocation to varying the rate of 
tasks and the resulting increased message flow. 

B. MCES 

Module 1: Problem Formulation for SINCGARS allocation 

The Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) 
concept expresses the requirement for rapid, reliable, secure, jam-resistant 
mobile voice and data communications. These requirements are met by 
SINCGARS, which has high capacity, promises a ten-to-one improvement in 
MTBF, has built-in encryption, is virtually jam-proof, is light and can carry 
either voice or data. Eventually SINCGARS may replace all existing VHF 
single-channel net radios on a one-for-one basis. But during the long 
changeover, there may be need (in fact there has been need!) for combat 
operations by Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). SINCGARS is downward 
compatible by operation in a non-hopping mode. However it thereby loses its 
protection against enemy jamming and exploitation by direction finding. 
Therefore it is likely that operational communications planners would in 
general create separate nets for SINCGARS and for the older radios. If so, the 
allocation decision can be thought of as the assignment of available 
SINCGARS to the nets that most need a reliable, secure, jam-resistant capacity 
to process the traffic it will encounter. Since the older radios can be secured by 



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existing VINSON cryptos, the security issue will not be further addressed 
here. 

The problem then can be stated as: What assignment of available 

SINCGARS to doctrinal nets will provide the most combat effective 
communications? Our current understanding is that the SINCGARS will 
become available at approximately 1000 per year with the earliest deliveries to 
the materiel and training establishments in order to complete testing and fill 
the maintenance and training pipelines. Once these pipelines are filled, the 
assignment can be responsive to the potential workload and threat in 
potential combat. 

Module 2: System Bounding 

This module identifies the environment of SINCGARS and the elements 
with which it must interact. The SINCGARS is a convenient, general 
purpose, VHP communications equipment which may appear in almost any 
of the C2 facilities (C2FACS) of the Marine Corps. Most of the current VHP 
single-channel capability is in the VRC-12 and PRC-77 radios so these are also 
relevant portions of the total communications system to be examined. It is 
assumed that any changes to the UHF, HP and multi-channel 
communications networks will not affect the the VHP equipments. 
Connectivity to non-Marine Corps units is not addressed because at the 
tactical level of the MEB this would be rare. 

An important MTACCS change is the planned increase in digital data 
traffic from increased automation of the other systems of the MTACCS such 
as TCO. SINCGARS has a data capability up to 16 kilobits/sec., which is 
compatible with current Marine Corps terminals. The current data terminal 



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most likely to be used with SINCGARS is the hand-held Digital 
Communications Terminal (DCT) which is very slow. Robustness to 
increased data traffic must be considered. The "Green Machine" the Marine 
Corps ruggedized IBM-compatible personal computer is being replaced with 
the AN/UYK 83 and 85 which also have compatible data rates. 

An important limitation of SINCGARS is the co-siting problem both with 
itself and with other VHP radios. The mutual interference limits the ability 
to have two SINCGARS operating antennas within several hundred feet. 
Remoting of antennas is required for large C2FACs. 

The other aspects of the physical environment of SINCGARS may be very 
severe but, there is no reason to believe SINCGARS will have less ruggedness 
than the current radios. SINCGARS is designed to Electro Magnetic Pulse 
(EMP) hardness standards but only conventional combat will be considered 
here. 

SINCGARS is considered to be invulnerable to enemy jamming and 
direction finding. The enemy threat to current VHP radios can be severe. In 
particular mobile receivers near the front line may easily be jammed since 
mobile antennas are not directional and terrain shielding is limited in most 
mobile operations. Direction finding is a threat against fixed VHP radio but is 
more likely to be used again the UHP and HP radios of more static higher 
headquarters and will not be considered further here. 

The major subsystems of the SINCGARS are the power supply, receiver- 
transmitter, vehicular adapter-amplifier, high power amplifier for long-range 
models, and antennas. The appropriate components are specified to be 
acquired with models VRC 89-92 and the PRC-119. This study will not 



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distinguish between these models since it is not known in general which 
model the particular C2FAC will prefer. As noted above about half of the 
SINCGARS are planned to be manpack and half are vehicular, which should 
allow sufficient flexibility. Also, more than 10% are planned to have a 
retransmission capability by the addition of a second power amplifier and 
retransmission cable. 

The SINCGARS will be compatible with NATO single channel VHF-FM 
radios as well as existing Marine Corps radios of the PRC 25/77 and VRC 12 
family (VRC 12/43/45/46/47/49/53/64 and GRC 125/160). The SINCGARS 
will also be compatible with the airborne ARC-210 for ground/air 
coordination. Aviation use of SINCGARS for air/ground coordination will 
receive limited attention in this study since only a very small number of 
SINCGARS are destined for aviation use. The SINCGARS will be utilized 
and supported in accordance with Communications Electronics Operating 
Instruction (CEOI). Generally they will be operated by specially trained 
members of the C2FACs. The operational concept is that of self-use rather 
than requiring a full-time operational specialist. Organizational maintenance 
at first and second echelons is to be performed by the unit. This is primarily 
battery replacement because of the long MTBF (over 1000 hours) and very 
short MTTR (goal of 15 minutes at organizational level). The elements of the 
SINCGARS allocation problem are sketched in the onion diagram in Figure 
11 . 

Module 3: C3 Process Definition for SINCGARS Allocation 

In this module the functions performed with the SINCGARS are 
identified. The five Marine Corps mission areas are air operations, ground 



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operations, intelligence, fire support and combat service support. The 
MAGTF Interoperability Requirements Concepts (MIRC) contains the 
interface tasks performed in the Marine Corps which are similar to to the 
MCES standard functions of sense, assess, generate, plan and direct. 




Each of these functions is performed by a subset of the C2FACS in a 
sequential fashion to accomplish the five missions. To capture these 
sequences the Marine Corps Technical Interface Design Plan for Marine 
Tactical Systems (MTS-TIDP) in its Volume II entitled Multiple Agency 
Message Exchange Sequences (MAMES) defines a three levels of functions. 
At the top level for each of the five mission areas are Marine Broad 
Operations Tasks (MBOTS) such as artillery call for fire in the fire support 
mission. Each MBOT is then subdivided, for example standard fire mission. 



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check fire etc. These subdivisions are called Broad Operational Subtasks 
(BOSTs). Each BOST is further subdivided into Message Exchange 
Occurrences (MEOs). Each MEO explicitly identifies the origin and 
destination C2FAQ the type of message sent and the net used for each MEO in 
accomplishing the BOST. In addition, each MEO cross-references the interface 
task which created it and the next interface task which its receipt supports. 
The normal sequence of the MEOs is roughly indicated for each BOST. There 
are as many as 50 MEOs for a BOST. 

For purposes of this module it is sufficient to note that the BOSTs and 
MEOs fully represent the tactical communication needs of the doctrinal C3 
functions of the Marine Corps. The volumes of the TIDP contain a structured 
representation of the required information flow in tactical operations since 
Volume III is the Message Element Dictionary (MED) or data dictionary. 
Volume IV is a Message Standard (MS) and Volume V is a Protocol Standard 
(PS). Together these provide most of the information needed to complete a 
simulation model of tactical communications in the Marine Corps, as will be 
discussed in further modules. The only weakness of the MTS-TIDP is that 
specific decisions required by the tasks are not identified, therefore the absence 
of information or information quality can’t be assessed in terms of task 
quality. The execution of the MEOs, the BOSTs, and the MBOTs can be 
addressed on the basis of their completion and how long they take, but not on 
their quality from this data base, which is the most detailed functional 
requirement we have been able to obtain. 



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Module 4: Integration of Elements and Functions 

In this module the C2FACs and the BOSTs are integrated into a 
conceptual model of the VHF tactical communications networks. As noted 
above this is possible because of the detailed definitional structure 
represented in the MIRC and TIDP. The TIDP is implemented in a relational 
data base which makes it possible to sort virtually any of the MEO 
information into the structure required. For example Tab A of Volume II at 
the TIDP lists the interface tasks and their C2FACs whereas Tab B of Volume 
II sorts the C2FACs and lists their tasks. 

Appendix A to this report lists SINCGARS C2FACs for the proposed 
analysis. Appendix B lists the nets for the analysis of VHF-FM single channel 
radio use has been added for review by the War Fighting Center for 
appropriateness. The designation was made by reviewing each MEO to 
determine whether it was a candidate for potential SINCGARS use. This was 
designated if the net was specified in the TDP as VHF as opposed to HF, UHF 
or MUX. Where several nets including VHF were specified, judgment of the 
substitutability of each SINCGARS engagement was made. Appendix C lists 
the potential SINCGARS nets of each C2FAC. This table allows judgement to 
be made of the potential number of SINCGARS radios at each C2FAC. This 
number can later be deduced given that a net has been selected for a 
SINCGARS allocation. 

Additionally designation of potential SINCGARS use in each MBOT and 
BOST has been made for validation by the War Fighting Center. This appears 
in Appendix D. The designation was based on the same process as above. 



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With the information above, a crosswalk can be made from task or 
C2FAC to SINCGARS net and vice versa. Additional information needed to 
change the conceptual model to a quantitative includes estimating how often 
the tasks must be performed or at least the relative frequency of the tasks. 
This information was pursued but no definitive data were found. A 
judgmental estimate can be made but a documented source cannot be found. 
These rates drive the traffic load of the communications architecture. 

The general architecture of VHP tactical communications has now been 
established. Specific candidates of SIKCGARS allocation to be evaluated can 
be created by choosing nets based on estimates by planners or by general 
principles such as giving SINCGARS to nets where traffic is anticipated to be 
high or which serve units which will be in position to be jammed. The 
conceptual model above identifies how many of these nets can be supported 
by a given number of SINCGARS. It remains to be shown how to measure 
the relative C3 effectiveness of alternative allocations of SINCGARS after the 
candidates are subjected to traffic load. 

Module 5: Specification of Measures for SINCGARS Allocation 

In this module a set of quantitative measures for assessing alternative 
allocations of SINCGARS to nets will be proposed. Measures of effectiveness 
can be categorized by level (MOP, MOE or MOPE) or by categories such as 
performance (how well the system does its job) and vulnerability (how 
reliably it does the job under fire). Both of these dimensions will be discussed 
below. 

The highest and generally most desirable measures are those of force 
effectiveness (MOFEs); MOFEs measure combat results for different 



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alternatives. This is the final mission payoff, but it is often very difficult to 
estimate how well a MAGTF would perform with different C3 systems. In 
fact a well-trained MAGTF might fight just about as well with any C3 system 
if given enough time to adapt its doctrine, training, personnel and procedures 
to that system. It takes a major step forward in C3 to have a significant 
improvement in MAGTF fighting performance. SINCGARS might be such a 
step forward if the scenario was an assault operation against a fully-alerted 
opponent heavily jamming with airborne or RPV jammers targeted against 
time-critical Marine Corps operations. It might be possible to develop such a 
scenario and a combat model to support it but none exists at this time to our 
knowledge. Even if it did, it might be argued that such scenario-dependence 
is not desirable in establishing SINCGARS allocations because of the need to 
train for many contingencies. 

The VVarfighting Center gave NFS guidance that although some scenario- 
dependence may be inescapable, it should be minimized in light of today's 
changing circumstances. Therefore it may be more appropriate to step down 
to measures of C3 effectiveness (MOEs) rather than MOFEs, keeping in mind 
the MAGTF combat mission to the highest extent possible. C3 MOEs measure 
how well the C3 system does its job and/or how reliably. The SINCGARS, as 
a tactical communications equipment, contributes to C3 in the dissemination 
of information and orders. The MBOTs, BOSTs and MEOs follow directly 
from the five mission areas and identify specifically which messages must 
flow in sequence to perform the C3 tasks. Thus a measure of how quickly and 
reliably the SINCGARS executes the MEO message flows can directly measure 
the Marine Corps' tactical communications effectiveness. The effect of 



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changing scenario can be introduced by escalating to higher rates (with fixed 
relative frequency). This would represent more difficult workloads and more 
capable enemies. 

A subjective allocation of SINCGARS could be made without a 
quantitative computational model at this stage simply by asking experienced 
officers to review the BOSTs and allocate the available SINCGARS to the 
VHP networks that are most important (highest traffic and most 
vulnerability). However, even experienced officers might have difficulty 
deciding the tradeoff of traffic and vulnerability and thinking through how 
the various nets would actually perform in each case. This is why a 
quantitative model such as discussed in the next module is desirable. 

The discussion above leaves open how the performance and 
vulnerability would be measured in the quantified model. The performance 
of a communications system can often be measured at the MOP level by 
counting number of voice channels or number of bits/second. SINCGARS as 
a single-channel voice radio does not offer major improvement over the 
PRC 77 or VRC-12 in a benign environment. As a data communications 
device it is superior. With a mix of voice and data traffic it is more difficult to 
assess SINCGARS at the MOP level. Therefore a higher level measure (MOE) 
is desirable. A C3 MOE that can be compared across communications, 
processing and sensing is timeliness. Timeliness is closely related to combat 
effectiveness if a time window exists for an operation i.e. if it is time critical. 
In the single-channel radio nets timeliness, time to complete transmissions 
would be such an MOE. Timeliness in this sense is a function of traffic 
workload. 



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Traffic workload can be obtained for a BOST from the MEOs as follows. 
The length of each message can be calculated in bits for data or seconds for 
voice (approximately). If relative frequency of the BOSTs can be estimated, 
the traffic load on each net can be calculated, since the sequence of messages 
(MOEs) is also known. As usual there may be transient delays even when 
total capacity is larger than the workload. These transient delays could be 
serious in fire support nets, during an attack for example. The total time late 
measures this impact. Jamming would overload unjammed nets and result 
in less timely completion of BOSTs. 

The various missions may have varying sensitivity to timeliness. This 
variability could be reflected by accumulating different penalties for each 
second of time delay depending on mission. The penalty would be sized to 
the relative importance of the time delay. The same penalties could be 
assessed for any delay on a specific net or could be different for each BOST or 
even for each MEO, since different messages and BOSTs are often transmitted 
on the same net. Assessing delay penalty at the level of MEO seems too low 
since a MEO is part of a BOST and does not represent completion of an 
activity. In other words, a partial BOST (MEO) doesn't accomplish anything. 
A penalty for each BOST seems most appropriate since a BOST represents a 
complete military task relevant to a mission area. Therefore time penalties 
will be assessed for each BOST. The total penalty-weighted time delay on the 
networks would be a satisfactory performance measure of how well the single 
channel VHP radios perform the C3 mission. An initial set of relative 
penalties are shown in Appendix D for each BOST. 



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The reliability aspect of the candidate architectures can be included in 
timeliness. Reliability can be separated into inherent failure (MTBF and 
MTTR), failure under attack (jamming or destruction) and operator failure 
(user friendliness). These failures are quite different but can all be 
represented by increased time delay to allow for repair or replacement, 
jamming work around, or operator entry and restart. Some of these failures 
would require additional input data concerning field conditions which are 
not yet available for SENCGARS. However inherent failure and jamming can 
be estimated and net entry time can be parametrically represented. 

Module 6: Generation of Output Data 

In this module a quantitative model is presented that would generate the 
penalized time delay on the single-channel nets. It is an object-oriented 
simulation written in the MODSIM language which can easily be 
manipulated to provide the values desired. The model developed has four 
fundamental object types, units, radios, nets, and the traffic generation object. 
In this section, we provide the salient detail of the model by describing the 
properties of these four object types. The unit object type is the base type from 
which all of the MAGTF units are derived. Instances of unit objects range 
from a platoon object (= 30 men) to a division object (~ 15,000 men). The 
communications equipment owned by a unit is housed in a radio array. Each 
radio is, in turn, connected to a radio net. The differences between unit types 
are the composition of the radio array and the rate of BOST initiation for each 
type of BOST, and the net membership of the radios owned by the unit. 

Each unit is stimulated by the traffic generator by having a stream of 
BOST initiations sent to it. The unit then determines the first MEO of the 



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DOST to pursue, finds all of the receivers which must receive the MEO, and 
submits the MEO for transmission on all of the nets required to reach the 
receivers. There are circumstances under which the unit will not be able to 
reach some of the intended receivers on the net specified by BOST. Thus, the 
unit contains a complex routing mechanism which determines the sequence 
of units who will relay the BOST to the intended receiver. 

Each BOST is being pursued via the execution of MEOs between units. 
After a unit is a receiver of an MEO, it consults the BOST to determine the 
next MEO. It determines the appropriate net using its routing mechanism, 
then submits this new MEO to the appropriate set of radios, one radio per 
radio net. The radio acts as a prioritized queue of MEOs, as well as possibly 
initiating busy periods of the attached radio net. In order to test the value of a 
specific architecture, the system must be stressed in a realistic fashion 
independent of a specific scenario. The use of the MBOT/BOST/MEO 
framework was briefly described above. 

An example of an MBOT in air operations is Artillery Call for Fire, with 
the constituent BOST Standard Call for Fire. This BOST might be initiated by 
a Battery Forward Observer (BTRY FO). It involves the cooperation of the 
Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center (BN FDC), the Infantry Battalion Fire 
Support Coordination Center (BN FSCC), and the Artillery Battery Fire 
Direction Center (ARTY BTRY FDC). The MEOs which are required to 
complete the Standard Call for Fire include the original call for fire, the 
clearing of the fire mission up the chain of command (optional), and the 
relaying of the clearance back down the chain (optional), the spotting and 
firing directions exchanged between the BTRY FO and BTRY ARTY FDC, the 



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end of mission and surveillance messages. There is some concurrency of 
MEOs in this mission, as well as a simple precedence structure between 
MEOs. 

Each of these actions is identified as a Task attached to one of the Message 
Exchanges within the MEO. Each specified message has associated with it a 
message format with the content identified message sender, receiver, radio 
net to be used, and duration. Some Tasks are pursued concurrently, while 
some have precedence over others. 

To generate traffic for the MAGTF tactical communications system, a 
sequence of BOSTs occurs at each unit. These BOSTs generate the specified 
MEO with the associated message traffic requirements and sequence. 

Each unit, j, in the MAGTF has an assumed rate of occurrence for each 
BOST, i, given as A,y if it is an initiator of that BOST. Our traffic generation 
scheme must produce BOST initiations at each of the initiating units at the 
specified relative rates. 

For efficiency and centralization of control, we will generate BOSTs in a 
central process: 



while (not TIME'S UP) 

sample DELAY with mean = 1/A 
wait DELAY 

choose a BOST and UNIT 
tell UNIT to INITIATE_BOST 
end while 

Algorithm 1. MODSIM Code for the BOST Generation Process 



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where X = Z(, y)A,-y. Given BOST i and unit j, the BOST-unit combination (/,;') is 
chosen with probability Xij/ X. If the delays are chosen to be exponential, then 
each BOST-unit initiation is a filtered Poisson process. Otherwise, each time 
between BOST-unit initiations is a sum of a geometric number of 
independent identically distributed delays. 

Radio net transmission time is the only limited resource in the model. A 
net may be thought of as a one-talker-at-a-time party line. Units connected to 
the net, called subscribers, all can receive every message transmitted on the 
net, while only one subscriber may transmit at any time. 

The nets in our model use a highest-priority-first message discipline, 
which may be slightly more orderly than the real system. When an 
opportunity for transmission takes place, the net polls each of the subscribers 
and chooses a unit wnth a highest-priority message at random. With 
penalties such as Appendix D for each BOST, a penalty weighted total delay 
can be computed for any allocation of SIKCGARS to the nets. 

The model must be exercised within an experimental design in order to 
provide statistically significant results. The experimental design will examine 
alternative allocations of SINCGARS to various nets). The allocations of 
SINCGARS to nets will be varied and the penalty-weighted time late 
accumulated with and without jamming. The model may also examine the 
effect of changes in the relative frequencies of the BOSTs and of values of the 
penalties to determine sensitivity to these subjective inputs. 

Module 7: Aggregation and Interpretation 

In this module the results of the model in terms of penalized delay will 
be displayed and integrated into recommendations for the Marine Corps with 



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regard to allocation of SENCGARS during the transition to an all-SINCGARS 
VHF single-channel capability. A discussion of the possible extension of the 
model to other issues will be given. 

The nature of the conclusions will be that certain nets are less robust for 
increased intensity or rate of BOSTs than others under jamming and should 
therefore be allocated SINCGARs when available. It is anticipated that this 
behavior will not be sensitive to the absolute number of SINCGARS 
available, but as more SINCGARS become available there will be less impact 
of the allocation on total penalty- weigh ted delay. 



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APPENDIX A. C2 FACS BASED ON 1ST MEB EXAMPLE 
FOR TACTICAL NETS 



1 . ) 1ST MEB COMMAND ELEMENT (MB CE) 

DCOC 

2) IC 

3) COMCON 

2 . ) DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER— 

1) DASC 

3 . ) 3RD MAR REGT GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT 

DCOC 

2) IC 

3) COMCON 

4) FSCC 

4 . ) BN 1 /3, 2/3 & 3/3 COMMAND POST 

Dccx: 

2) FC 

3) COMCON 

5. ) A, B,&C COMPANY OF 1/3 MARINES 

DCP 

6. ) ARTILLERY BN 

1) FDC 

7. ) 5/11 SP ARTILLERY 

1) FDC 

8. ) FORWARD OBSERVERS 

1) FO 

9. ) A COMPANY TANKS 

DCP 

10.) B COMPANY TRACKS 
DCP 



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APPENDIX B. TACTICAL NETS FOR 1ST MEB EXAMPLE 



NET NET NAME 

1 MEB TACl 

2 MEB CSS 

3 MEB COMM COORD 

5 RADIO BN CRITICOMM 

6 ECM CONTROL 

7 3D MAR CM D 

8 3D MAR TAC 

9 3D MAR INTEL 

10 3D MAR COMM COORD 

11 3D MAR ESC 

12 1/12 COF 

13 1/12 CMD 

14 1/12FD 

15 TAR/HR 

16 MED BN EVAC COORD AIR 

17 1/3 TACl 

18 1/3 MORTAR 

19 1/3 TACP LOCAL 

20 A1/12COF 

21 2/3 TACl 

22 2/3 MORTAR 

23 2/3 TACP LOCAL 

24 B1/12COF 

25 3/3 TACl 

26 3/3 MORTAR 

27 3/3 TACP LOCAL 

28 C1/12COF 

29 A1/12CMD 

30 B1/12CMD 

31 C1/12CMD 

32 N5/11 COF 

33 COA CMD 

34 1ST PLT CO A CMD 

35 2D PLT CO A CMD 

36 3D PLT CO A CMD 

37 CO B CMD 

38 1ST PLT COB CMD 

39 2D PLT COB CMD 

40 3D PLT COB CMD 

41 3TH PLT COB CMD 



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APPENDIX C C2FACS AND THEIR TACTICAL NETS 



EXAMPLE BASED ON 1ST MEB 



1ST MEB COMMAND ELEMENT (MEB CE) 

COC— MEB TACTICAL (TAC) NET 

COC— MEB COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) 

COMCON— MEB COMMUNICATION COORDINATION (COMM) 

IC— ECM CONTROL 

A12 COMBAT ELEMENT (ACE) DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC) 
DASC— TACTICAL AIR REQUEST/HELO REQUTST (TAR/HR) 

DASC— MECIAL BN EVACUATION COORDINATION 

GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (GCE)— 3RD MARINE INF REGIMENT 
COC— MEB TAC NET 
COMCON— MEB COMM 
COC— 3RD MARINE COMMAND (CMD) 

COC— 3RD MARINE TAC 
IC— 3RD MARINE INTEL 

FSCC— 3RD MARINE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION (FSC) 

FSCC— 1ST BN 12TH MARINE ARTILLERY REGT CONDUCT OF FIRE (COF) 

FSCC— 1ST BN 12TH MARINE ARTILLERY REGT CMD 

FSCC— 1ST BN 12TH MARINE ARTILLERY REGT FIRE DIRECTION (FD) 

1/3 BATTALION COMMAND POST (BN CP)— SIMILARLY FOR 2/3, 3/3 
COC— 3RD MARINE CMD NET 
COC— 3RD MARINT TAC 
IC— 3RD MARINE INTELLIGENCE (INT) 

COMCON— 3RD MARINE COMM 
FSCC— 3RD MARINE FSC 
COC— 1/3 MARINE TAC 
FSCC— MORTAR 

FSCC— TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY LOCAL (TACP) 

FSCC— BN COF 
FSCC— BATTERY COF 
FSCC— TAR/HR 

A 1 /3 COMPANY— SIMILARLY B AND C COMPANIES FOR EACH BN 
COC— BN TAC 

ARTILLERY BATTALION 1/12 

FDC— INFANTRY REGIMENT FIRE SUPPORT C(X)RD (FSC) 

FDC— BN COF 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



64 



FDC— BN CMD 
FDC— FD 
FDC— A 1/12 COF 
FEX:— B1/12COF 
FIX— C 1/12 COF 

A BATTERY 1/12 

FDC— 1/1 2 BN COF 
FDC— 1/12 CMD 
FDC— 1/12 FD 
FDC— A 1/12 CMD 
FDC— A 1/1 2 COF 

A RIFLE COMPANY FORWARD OBSERVER— SIMILARLY FOR B AiND C FO 1/12 
FO— 1/1 2 BN COF 
FO— A 1/12 COF 

N5/11 SP ARTILLERY 
FDC— 2/3 TAC 
FDC— 1/12 COF 
FDC— 1/12 CMD 
FDC— 1/12 FD 
FDC— N 5/11 CMD 

A COMPANY 1ST TANKS— SIMILARLY B COMPANY TRACKS 
CP— A COMPANY CMD 
CP— 1/2 TAC 

1ST PLATOON A COMPANY— SIMILARLY 2ND AND 3RD PLATOON 
CP— A COMPANY CMD 
CP— 1ST PLATOON CMD 



Sovereign — Task lA MCE5 



65 



APPENDIX D. TIME-LATE PENALTIES FOR BOSTS 



The delay in performance of individual Basic Operational SubTasks 
(BOSTs) from jamming or simply because of traffic may have differing effects 
on performance of the Marine Corps missions depending upon the BOST. 
Delay of a reporting task will not directly cause lives to be lost but delay to a 
fire mission may. Therefore in aggregating total delay, the minutes of delay 
should be given differing weights in calculating a C3 measure of effectiveness 
based on timeliness. This appendix describes a set of relative weights or 
penalties for each of the BOSTs. 

Before describing the results however it is noted that the BOSTs have 
been partitioned into those that are relevant to VHF single-channel nets and 
those that are not. This reduces the number of penalties to be determined. 
The BOSTs not considered are primarily the aviation and amphibious 
landing BOSTs that are performed with radios of other frequencies or higher 
capacities and are not candidates for SINCGARs. In addition the Combat 
Service Support (CSS) BOSTs are not considered (with the exception of the 
combat operations request for combat service support) in this baseline 
analysis. 

The initial set of penalties for the SINCGARS relevant BOSTs are given 
in the accompanying table. Appendix D. They were estimated by relative 
judgments of the research team with a base penalty of 100 for the standard fire 
mission BOST under the call for force MBOT. Only a few BOSTs score higher 
than this. In general those BOSTs that involve execution of immediate fires 
have about 100 points and all others have lower penalties. Coordination of 



Sovereign — Task 1A MCES 



66 



fire BOSTs have the next highest penalties, followed by planning and finally 
reporting which have values of 5 to 10 points. This leaves room for combat 
service support BOSTs to be added at a later date if desired. 

The point scheme was designed to give an order of magnitude difference 
in ratio values between the most time critical and least time critical combat 
operations. We believe the order of penalties would not significantly vary 
between individual raters although the penalty ratio might vary. 

The penalties in this appendix are for each minute of delay or time late. 
This could be measured from either initiation of the BOST or from some 
threshold time after initiation based on precedence (i.e. 10 minutes for 
FLASH messages) or other standard operating procedure or CEOI thresholds. 
It would also be possible to extend the penalty structure to include a one-time 
penalty for any delay above a threshold. This could provide additional 
discrimination between alternative allocations but would be dependent upon 
setting an acceptable threshold, which may be difficult to establish. If 
required, the one-time penalties could be established as a multiple of the 
penalties estimated above. The size of the multiple could be the same for 
each BOST somewhere in the range of a multiple of 10 to 100 or could v'ary by 
BOST category. 

An additional hierarchical dimension to the penalties could be added to 
reflect relative importance of the BOSTs as a function of whether they were 
initiated by the platoon, company, battalion or brigade. With respect to fire 
mission it is unlikely that there is any difference in the importance of the 
message according to the command hierarchy. However for planning 
messages or orders it can be argued that delay moving down the chain of 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



67 



command implies that many more units will be affected then by delay at the 
bottom of the chain. Therefore it may be desirable to introduce a factor to 
change some of the penalties based on command level. At this time the 
initiators of each DOST are not yet specified so this refinement must wait 
until data on frequencies of initiation of BOSTs by command level are 
known. It is likely that a BOST will ordinarily only be initiated by one level 
of command. The initial set of penalties then are shown in Appendix D as 
penalties per minute of delay from initiation of the BOST. 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



68 



MULTIPLE AGENCY MESSAGE EXCHANGE SEQUENCES 
MISSION AREA— MBOT— BOST COMBINATIONS 





VHP 

RELEVANT 


RELATIVE 

PENALTY 


Air Operations 

Offensive Air Support 

Cbse Air Support — Preplanned Mission 


no 




Close Air Support — Immediate Mission 


no 


- 


Antiair Warfare 

Passive Air Defense 


no 




Active Air Defense 


no 




Assault Support 

Air Logistics Support 


no 




Search and Rescue 


no 


- 


Control of Aircraft and MIssbns 

Empbyment of Aviation Assets 


no 


. 


Airspace and Air Traffic Control 


no 


- 


Intelligence 

Intelligence Planning and Direction 
Determine Requirements 


no 




Collection Planning 


no 


- 


Collection Orders and Requests 


yes 


55 


Intelligence Collection 
Signals Intelligence 


no 




Surveillance and Reconnaissance 


no 


- 


Intelligence Dissemination 
Intelligence Reports 


yes 


60 


Intelligence Summary 


no 


- 


Target Intelligence Report 


yes 


80 


Electronic Warfare 

Reauests EW Support 


yes 


80 


Tasks EW Suocort 


ves 


80 


Combat Operations 

Warfighting Plans and Orders 

Submit MAGTF Operational Planning Data 


yes 


5 


Submit GCE Operatbnal Planning Data 


yes 


5 


Submit ACE Operatbnal Planning Data 


no 


- 


Submit CSSE Operatbnal Planning Data 


yes 


10 


Develop and Distribute MAGTF Operation Plans and Orders 


yes 


10 


Develop and Distribute GCE Operation Plans and Orders 


no 


- 


Develop and Distribute ACE Operation Plans and Orders 


no 


- 


Develop and Distribute CSSE Operation Plans and Orders 


no 


- 


warlighting Ship to Shore Operations 
Advise Navy Control Organization 
Report Ship to Shore Movement 
Advise Helicopter Control Agencies 
Coordinate Personnel and Equipment Transfers 
Coordinate Supply Build-up 
Coordinate Beach Party Activities 
Receive and Report Serial Status 
Receive and Report Landing of Scheduled Waves 
Receive and Report Serial Records 
Submit Ship Disposition Reports 
Warfighting Communbation Procedures 
Communbation System Adjustment 
Coordinate Communication System Troubleshooting 


yes 


60 


Submit Communication Systems Update 


yes 


80 


Supervise Technical Coordination 


ves 


20 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



69 





VHP 

RELEVANT 


RELATIVE 

PENALTY 


Combat Operations 

Warfighting Operations 






Receive and Distribute Combat Data 


yes 


30 


MAGTF Operational Reporting 


yes 


20 


GCE Operational Reporting 


yes 


10 


ACE Operational Reporting 


no 


10 


CSSE Operational Reporting 


no 


- 


Nuclear Event Reporting 


yes 


50 


NBC Attack Reporting 


yes 


50 


Request Additional Support 


yes 


45 


Coordinate Combat Activities 


yes 


25 


Coordinate RPV Activities 


yes 


25 


Environmental Information 


yes 


20 


Collect and Disseminate Weather Data 


no 


- 


Fire Support 

Artilleiy Call for Rre 






Check Fire 


yes 


125 


Counterfire Radar (CFF^ Fire Mission 
Final Protective Fire (FPF) Adjustment 


yes 


130 


yes 


150 


High Angle Fire Mission 


yes 


100 


High Burst/Mean Point of Impact Registration 


yes 


40 


Precision Registration — FO 


yes 


40 


Precision Registration — NAO/TAO 


yes 


80 


Standard Fire Mission — FO 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — Div Recon TM 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — Meb Recon TM 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — Meb RPV 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — Met Recon TM 


yse 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — MEF RPV 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — MEU Recon TM 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — MEU RPV 


yes 


100 


Standard Fire Mission — Regiment Artillery Obs TM 


yes 


100 


Suppression Fire 


yes 


40 


Call for and Adjust Fire — NAO/TAO 


yes 


100 


Close Air Support (CAS 




Immediate Mission — FAC 


yes 


120 


Control CAS— NAO/TAO 


yes 


120 


Preplanned on-call Mission — FAC 


yes 


80 


Preplanned Scheduled Mission— FAC 


yes 


80 


Preplanned Scheduled Mission — ASRT 


yes 


80 


Close-in Fire Support (CIFS) 
Immediate Mission — FAC 




yes 


140 


Preplanned on-call Mission — FAC 


yes 


100 


Preplanned Scheduled Mission — FAC 


yes 


100 


Fire Planning 




Coordinate Subordinate C2FAC Activities 


yes 


25 


Disseminate Coordination and Control Measures 


yes 


25 


Establish Coordination and Control Measures 


yes 


25 


Establish Target Processing Center 


no 


- 


Position Naval Gunfire Radar Beacon Team 


yes 


25 


Request Allocation of Additional Fire Support 


yes 


30 


Request Supporting Arms Support 


yes 


35 


Resolve Fire Support Coordination Problems 


yes 


30 


Resolve Fire Support Conflicts 


yes 


30 


Tactical Alerts 


no 


- 


Target Assignment 


yes 


20 


Target Intelligence Acquisition 


no 


- 


Fire Support Reporting 






Aerial Recon Reports 


no 


- 


Counterfire Radar Section Location Report 


yes 


20 


Fire Direction Center Reports 


yes 


10 


Meteoroloaical (Met) Reoorts 


ves 


5 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



70 





VHF 

RELEVANT 


RELATIVE 

PENALTY 


Fire Support 






Fire Support Reporting 






Naval Gunfire Radar Beacon Team Location Report 


yes 


10 


Observer/Controller Reports 


yes 


5 


Supporting Arms Reports 


yes 


5 


Survey Reports 


yes 


10 


Shelling Report (SHELREP) 


yes 


15 


Mortar Call for Fire 






Registration Mission 


yes 


40 


Standard Fire Mission 


yes 


100 


Naval Gunfire (NGF) Call for Fire 






Direct Support Naval Gunfire Mission 


no 


- 


Direct Support Naval Gunfire Mission — RVP 


no 


- 


General Support Naval Gunfire Mission 


no 


- 


Massed Fires 


no 


• 



Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



71 



INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 

1. Library (Code 52) 2 

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Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

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Alexandria, VA 22314 

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Code OR-Pd 

Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

5. Department of Operations Research (Code OR) 1 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

6. Prof. Donald Gaver, Code OR-Gv 15 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

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Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

8. Prof. Michael Bailey, Code OR/Ba 1 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, CA 93943-5000 

9. Prof. William Kemple, Code OR/Ke 1 

Naval Postgraduate School 

Monterey, CA 93943-5000 



72 

Sovereign — Task lA MCES 



10. Prof. Michael G. Sovereign, Code OR-Sm 15 

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13. Mr. Richard A. Voltz, WF-13F 1 

Marine Corps Combat Developments Command 

Quantico, VA 22134-5001 

14. Dr. Alfred George Brandstein, VVF-SA 1 

Marine Corps Combat Developments Command 

Quantico, VA 22134-5001 

15. Captain M. Sagaser 1 

Marine Corps Combat Developments Command 

Quantico, VA 22134-5001 

16. Dr. Tom Julian 1 

INSS/CCRP 

National Defense University 
Ft. McNair 

Washington, DC 20319-6000 



73 

Sovereign — Task JA MCES 




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